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THE "TOMAHAWK" AND THE "HEALING BALM"':
DRUG TREATMENT
COURTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE
RICHARD C. BOLDT*
There is a strong association in the United States ("U.S.")
between the misuse of alcohol and other drugs and criminal
offending. 2 The correlation is complex, as there are a number of
"predisposing" factors that are common both to substance abuse and to
criminal involvement, including poverty, unemployment, and mental
illness.3 Whatever the precise causal dynamics of these associated
characteristics, the consequence of this relationship is a broad overlap
between the universe of persons processed by the criminal system and
those targeted by the substance abuse treatment system.4 In a 1998
study, as many as eighty percent of inmates and others under criminal
Copyright C 2010 by Richard C. Boldt.
* Professor, University of Maryland School of Law. I am grateful to Eileen Canfield and
Danielle Citron for their comments on a draft of this essay.
1. Benedikt Fischer, Doing Good with a Vengeance: A Critical Assessment of the
Practices, Effects and Implications of Drug Treatment Courts in North America, 3 CRIM.
JUST.: INT'L J. POL'Y & PRAC. 227, 235 (2003). Fischer attributes this phrase to Alfred
Lindesmith, a pioneer in the field of drug policy studies who was an early skeptic of using
criminal coercion to facilitate the treatment of persons who misuse drugs. See Alfred R.
Lindesmith, Dope Fiend Mythology, 31 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 199, 207 (1940).
2. The correlation between drug abuse and criminal involvement has been noted for
some time. See JAMES A. INCIARDI, THE WAR ON DRUGS: HEROIN, COCAINE, CRIME, AND
PUBLIC POLICY (1986); J. Scott Sanford & Bruce A. Arrigo, Lifting the Cover on Drug Courts:
Evaluation Findings and Policy Concerns, 49 INT'L J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 239 (2005).
3. See KING COUNTY BAR ASS'N DRUG POLICY PROJECT, EFFECTIVE DRUG CONTROL:
TOWARD A NEW LEGAL FRAMEWORK 93 (2005). See also Candido Da Agra, The Complex
Structures, Processes and Meanings of the Drug/Crime Relationship, in DRUGS AND CRIME
DEVIANT PATHWAYS 9 (Serge Brochu et al. eds., 2002); Karen Duke, Out of Crime and into
Treatment?: The Criminalization of Contemporary Drug Policy Since Tackling Drugs
Together, 13 DRUGS: EDUC. PREVENTION & POL'Y 409, 413 (2006).
4. See Steven S. Martin & James A. Inciardi, Case Management Approaches For
Criminal Justice Clients, in DRUG TREATMENT AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE 81 (James A. Inciardi
ed. 1993). The degree of this overlap has been intensified by the decision of state and federal
lawmakers, prosecutors and law enforcement officials to target and prosecute drug possession
cases. While observers like Douglas Marlowe may be correct in arguing that the overlap
would exist even if possession were decriminalized, such a policy of decriminalization would
be likely to have the effect of reducing substantially the number of drug-involved persons in
the criminal system. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Effective Strategies for Intervening with Drug
Abusing Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REV. 989, 993 (2002) [hereinafter Marlowe, Effective
Strategies]; See also KING COUNTY BAR Ass'N DRUG POLICY PROJECT, supra note 3, at 47-49,
64.
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supervision were determined to be "drug involved."5 This means that
those individuals were either under the influence of alcohol or other
drugs during the commission of their offense, committed the offense to
obtain drugs, committed (or were charged with committing) an alcohol
or other drug-related crime, or were regular substance abusers.6 Over
half of all violent crimes, including family violence, child abuse and
neglect, and property offenses, involve alcohol or other drug misuse by
the offender (and sometimes the victim as well).7 At the same time,
many in treatment for substance use disorders either have pending
criminal charges, have been sentenced to community supervision, have
been conditionally released from prison on parole, or have served
criminal sentences in the past.8
Given the association between substance misuse and offending,
success in drug treatment appears to have a measurable impact on
lowering crime rates.9 Persons who enter into a sustained period of
abstinence from (or substantially lower rates of) substance misuse tend
to have reduced levels of criminal offending and fewer involvements
in the criminal system.'0 These data thus suggest that interventions that
effectively reduce alcohol and other drug use disorders are likely to
have a beneficial impact on the incidence of crime, on rates of
incarceration, and on public safety.''
5. See Douglas B. Marlowe, Integrating Substance Abuse Treatment and Criminal
Justice Supervision, SCI. & PRAC. PERSP., Aug. 2003, at 4, 4 [hereinafter Marlowe, Integrating
Treatment and Supervision] (citing S. BELENKO & J. PEUGH, NAT'L CTR. ON ADDICTION &
SUBSTANCE ABUSE, COLUMBIA UNIV., BEHIND BARS: SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND AMERICA'S




9. See Marlowe, Effective Strategies, supra note 4, at 996.
10. See Adele Harrell & John Roman, Reducing Drug Use and Crime Among Offenders:
The Impact of Graduated Sanctions, 31 J. DRUG ISSUES 207 (2001).
I1. This claim should be placed in context. As Peter Reuter and Alex Stevens have
explained:
The most fundamental point to understand about drug policy is that there
is little evidence that it can influence the number of drug users or the share
of users who are dependent. There is no research showing that any of the
tougher enforcement, more prevention or increased treatment has
substantially reduced the number of users or addicts in a nation. There are
numerous other cultural and social factors that appear to be much more
important.
Peter Reuter & Alex Stevens, Assessing UK Drug Policy From A Crime Control Perspective,
8 CRIMINOLOGY & CRIM. JUST. 461, 474 (2008). On the other hand, Reuter and Stevens also
report that "there is a great deal of evidence that, on average, treatment can help dependent
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For many years, the primary approach in the U.S. to reducing
drug misuse and the criminal conduct attendant upon it has been to
criminalize the unauthorized possession and distribution of controlled
substances, and to rigorously enforce these prohibitions.' 2 This
traditional criminal punishment-based approach has proven to be
ineffective.13 More than eighty percent of drug-abusing offenders
resume drug use within one year of release from prison, and well over
ninety percent do so within three years.14 Even offenders who have
received drug abuse treatment while incarcerated tend to exhibit a high
rate of relapse,' 5 and those who receive no transitional care upon
release appear to do no better than other drug abusing ex-offenders
who receive no treatment while in prison. 16
In light of these failures, a number of advocates have called for
an alternative medical approach to dealing with drug addiction.' 7 This
approach views alcohol and other drug use disorders as diseases
requiring treatment in the community rather than isolation and
drug users cut down both on the quantities of drugs they use and the volume of crime they
commit, even if many treated users continue some illegal drug use and offending." Id. at 475.
12. One indicator of the heavy reliance in the U.S. on criminal enforcement as the
primary drug control strategy is the distribution of resources in the National Drug Control
Budget. In the years from 2000 to 2009, the percentage of the national budget devoted to
"supply reduction" has varied from fifty-three to sixty-five percent of overall expenditures. By
contrast, the percentage devoted to "treatment" has remained in a range from twenty-two to
twenty-seven. See FY 2009 Federal Drug Control Budget Released; Prevention Continues to
Receive Dwindling Proportion of Funding, CESAR FAX,(Univ. of Md. Center for Substance
Abuse Research, College Park, Md.), Mar. 10, 2008, at 1.
13. While it is possible that the criminal enforcement approach may produce some
general deterrence or otherwise reduce demand by pushing up the street price of drugs, there is
insufficient empirical data to form a confident conclusion with respect to these assertions. See
e.g., Reuter & Stevens, supra note I1, at 469 ("There is little evidence that targeting
distributors and retailers of illicit drugs for arrest leads to reductions in drug use."). On the
other hand, we do have considerable data on the specific deterrence effects of this policy, and
it is most unimpressive. See infra text accompanying notes 15 to 17. In contrast to the shaky
case with respect to the claimed benefits in terms of deterrence produced by the criminal
punishment approach, we know that the enforcement policy has imposed severe social costs
relating to the disruption of families, communities and public institutions. See KING COUNTY
BAR Ass'N DRUG POLICY PROJECT, supra note 3, at 56-59.
14. See e.g., Steven Martin et al., Three-Year Outcomes for In-Prison Therapeutic
Community Treatment for Drug-Involved Offenders in Delaware: From Prison to Work
Release to Aftercare, 79 PRISON J. 294, 307, 310 (1999).
15. See Clive R. Hollin, Treatment Programs for Offenders: Meta-Analysis, "What
Works, " and Beyond, 22 INT'L J. L. & PSYCH. 361, 363, 366 (1999).
16. See Martin et al., supra note 14, at 306-3 10.
17. See generally Evan S. Dellon, David C. Lewis, & Camille A. Gear, Alternatives to
U.S. Drug Policy, 17 J. PRIMARY PREVENTION 383, 383, 400-05 (1997).
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punishment.' 8 Critics of this strategy note, however, that success in
treatment (measured as length of time to relapse) is directly related to
the length of time that clients are retained in treatment. 19 According to
some research, three months of participation in drug treatment
ordinarily is the minimum threshold for producing positive results, and
twelve months in treatment may be the median point in the distribution
of outcomes. Thus, approximately fifty percent of clients who
complete twelve months of treatment maintain sobriety for an
additional twelve months after completing treatment. 20 Unfortunately,
attrition rates for community-based substance abuse treatment are
high. Depending upon the treatment modality, drop-out rates can run
as high as ninety percent during the first year of treatment, which
means that most clients who are "voluntarily" in treatment leave
before obtaining a clinical "dose" sufficient to produce a measurably
positive outcome.21
Advocates of the drug court model and of many of the
problem-solving court variations on that model point to the
shortcomings of both the traditional criminal punishment approach and
the medical alternative and argue that an integrated third way is
22 23
necessary. In their view, combining the coercive aspects of the
criminal system with the therapeutic tools in place within the
community-based treatment system offers the best hope of retaining
clients in treatment, thereby reducing relapse and, by extension,
overall crime rates. This argument for deploying the coercive
18. See A. Thomas McLellan et al., Drug Dependence, a Chronic Medical Illness:
Implications for Treatment, Insurance, and Outcomes Evaluation, 284 J. AM. MED. Ass'N
1689 (2000).
19. See Marlowe, Integrating Treatment and Supervision, supra note 5, at 6.
20. See id. The data suggest that rates of substance abuse relapse and criminal re-
offending both are correlated with a client's length of stay in treatment. See Douglas M.
Anglin and Yih-ing Hser, Legal Coercion and Drug Abuse Treatment: Research Findings and
Social Policy Implications, in HANDBOOK OF DRUG CONTROL IN THE UNITED STATES 151
(James A. Inciardi, ed. 1990).
21. See Marlowe, Integrating Treatment and Supervision, supra note 5, at 6.
22. See Marlowe, Effective Strategies, supra note 4, at 990.
23. For an argument that coercion is an effective feature of treatment, see generally
SALLY SATEL, DRUG TREATMENT: THE CASE FOR COERCION (1999). On the use of coercion in
alcohol and other drug treatment more generally, see Douglas M. Anglin and Yih-ing Hser,
supra note 20. Although the North American literature generally concludes that coerced
treatment works, the international literature on this topic reports mixed results. See Alex
Stevens et al., Quasi-compulsory Treatment of Drug Dependent Offenders: An International
Literature Review, 40 SUBSTANCE USE & MISUSE 269 (2005).
24. As Peggy Hora and William Schma have put it:
The question of whether coerced treatment provides an individual with the
proper incentives to successfully complete a treatment program stands as a
2010] DRUG COURTS IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 49
features of the criminal system to improve treatment outcomes has
been widely adopted.
More than 2,000 drug courts now operate throughout the U.S.
and in a number of other countries.25 Hundreds of other problem-
solving courts derived in one way or another from drug courts are also
26in operation.26 A frequently asked question is whether drug courts
really "work." The answer, not surprisingly, depends on how the
question is framed. The data do seem to indicate that drug courts
increase the retention rate of clients in treatment. 27 Given that retention
in treatment consistently has been shown to correlate with successful
treatment outcomes, and given that success in treatment has been
correlated with reduced rates of re-offending, 28 one would expect that
drug courts would also produce positive results with respect to
criminal recidivism. In fact, the results in this regard generally are
positive.
In a recent essay entitled, "The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts,"
longtime drug court watcher, Douglas Marlowe, reported on the results
of five meta-analyses of adult drug treatment courts.29 Marlowe
concluded that the meta-analyses, which encompassed scores of
empirical evaluations of these courts, showed that "drug courts
significantly reduce crime by an average of approximately 8% to 26%,
traditional point of concern with treatment providers. Through the years,
many experts in the drug treatment field have questioned the effectiveness
of legally coerced treatment due to a belief that individuals must enter a
program voluntarily in order to have the requisite state of mind for
recovery. . . Recent studies and findings by several researchers and
treatment specialists serve to dispel and debunk this notion. . . "[T]he
'coercion' actually improves the substance abusers' chances of
overcoming their addiction."
Peggy Fulton Hora, et al., Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement: Revolutionizing the Criminal Justice System's Response to Drug Abuse and Crime
in America, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 439, 526 (1999) (internal citations omitted) (quoting
CENTER FOR SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,
TREATMENT IMPROVEMENT PROTOCOL SERIES No. 23 TREATMENT DRUG COURTS: INTEGRATING
SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT WITH LEGAL CASE PROCESSING, 58 (1996)).
25. See NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, AMERICA'S PROBLEM-SOLVING
COURTS: THE CRIMINAL COSTS OF TREATMENT AND THE CASE FOR REFORM 14 (2009)
[hereinafter NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS].
26. See id. For a detailed examination of drug treatment courts and other problem-
solving courts outside of the U.S., see JAMES L. NOLAN, LEGAL ACCENTS, LEGAL BORROWING:
THE INTERNATIONAL PROBLEM-SOLVING COURT MOVEMENT (2009).
27. See Marlowe, Integrating Treatment and Supervision, supra note 5, at 7.
28. See supra notes 9 to II and accompanying text.
29. Douglas B. Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, ADVOC., (Idaho State Bar)
Sept. 2008, at 14 [hereinafter Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts].
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with most estimates falling around 14%.,,30 Another recent report,
issued by the Sentencing Project, also found support in the research
data for the conclusion that drug courts produce reduced rates of either
re-arrest or re-conviction relative to control groups of substance
misusing offenders processed through the traditional criminal system,
although the averages reported in this study were in the eight to
thirteen percent range. 3 ' The Sentencing Project authors warned,
however, that "there is some reason to be cautious when interpreting
these results." 32 The basis for their caution is interesting, and worth
quoting at length:
Some studies show little or no impact from drug court
participation and it can be difficult to specify which
components of the program or the research design may
be contributing to these results. For example, are the
evaluation models appropriately specifying relevant
factors that may impact outcomes, but are external to
the treatment design? Gender, age, race, socioeconomic
background, criminal history, and substance abuse
history have all been shown to impact treatment
outcomes. Many of these variables are not accounted
for in analyses of drug court effectiveness.
Operationalizing drug court variables can be difficult
and outcome measures may be reflecting the interaction
of these variables with the treatment modality.33
In 2005, the Government Accountability Office (GAO) issued
a report based on over two dozen well-constructed research
investigations of drug courts.34 The GAO conducted this study
30. Id.
31. RYAN S. KING & JILL PASQUARELLA, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DRUG COURTS: A
REVIEW OF THE EVIDENCE 5-7 (2009). The Sentencing Project describes itself as a "national
non-profit organization engaged in research and advocacy on criminal justice policy issues."
Id. at tit. p.
32. Id. at 6.
33. Id. at 6-7.
34. See U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ADULT DRUG COURTS: EVIDENCE
INDICATES RECIDIVISM REDUCTIONS AND MIXED RESULTS FOR OTHER OUTCOMES (2005)
[hereinafter GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS]. Previously, in 2002, the GAO had published a
report in which it concluded that we "lack vital information" necessary to determine whether
drug courts are effective. See GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: BETTER DOJ
DATA COLLECTION AND EVALUATION EFFORTS NEEDED TO MEASURE IMPACT OF DRUG COURT
PROGRAMS 3 (2002). See also GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG COURTS: OVERVIEW OF
GROWTH, CHARACTERISTICS, AND RESULTS (1997) (concluding that there was insufficient
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pursuant to a Congressional directive contained in a 2002 federal law
that reauthorized the award of federal grants to localities for drug
courts.35 The GAO looked at four measures of effectiveness: criminal
recidivism, substance use relapse, program completion, and costs
versus benefits.36 The authors undertook a systematic review of the
available drug court research literature, resulting in their identification
of 117 evaluations of adult drug courts conducted from May 1997 to
January 2004. Of these identified reports, they selected the twenty-
seven that met their criteria for "methodological soundness."37
Most of the selected evaluations used research designs in
which participants in the drug court under review were compared to
"an appropriate group of similar offenders who did not participate in
the drug court program." 38 Five of the twenty-seven evaluations
involved participants who had been randomly assigned to either a
participant or a control group.39 Most of the remaining evaluations
either used contemporaneous comparison groups made up of offenders
from similar, neighboring jurisdictions or historical control groups
made up of defendants who had been processed by the same court just
before the introduction of the drug court.4 0 Because most of the
selected evaluations employed "quasi-experimental comparison
groups" instead of randomly assigned experimental control groups, the
researchers had to confront the problem of "selection bias," which is
the danger that the control group would be systematically different
from the study group. Each of the selected evaluations responded to
empirical evidence that drug treatment courts were effective in terms of reducing criminal
offense recidivism or substance use relapse). In particular, the GAO pointed out that most of
the studies of drug treatment courts that had been undertaken prior to 2002 used biased
comparison samples, such as offenders who declined to participate in drug court or were
deemed ineligible, measured the recidivism rates of drug court graduates rather than the entire
experimental group of drug court participants, and generally failed to employ randomized
experimental groups. See id.; see also Marlowe, Integrating Treatment and Supervision, supra
note 5, at 8.
35. See Title II of the 21st Century Department of Justice Appropriations Authorization
Act, Pub. L. No. 107-273, 116 Stat. 1758, 1795-1799 (2002).
36. See GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 2.
37. Id. "[T]o assess recidivism and substance use relapse, we selected evaluations that
used either an experimental design in which (1) eligible offenders were randomly assigned to
different programs or conditions and (2) there was an acceptable level of attrition or a quasi-
experimental design in which (1) all drug court program participants were compared with an
appropriate group of comparable offenders who did not participate in the drug court program,
and (2) appropriate statistical methods were used to adjust, or control, for group differences."
Id. at 10.
38. Id. at 2.
39. See id.
40. See id. at 18.
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this potential threat to the validity of the research by employing design
features or statistical methods to insure that the two groups were
41
similar in relevant ways.
An examination of other recent meta-analyses of the effect of
drug court participation on criminal recidivism reveals that much of
the underlying research upon which these meta-analyses rely does not
employ randomly assigned experimental control groups, and a number
do not base their comparisons on control groups that are reliably free
from selection bias. One well-cited meta-study was based on
underlying research in which only thirteen percent of the direct studies
employed random control groups.42 Moreover, this analysis employed
constituent research in which fourteen percent of the comparison
groups were made up of drug court "drop outs/non graduates" and
thirty-two percent were comprised of offenders who were "eligible but
did not participate."4 3 Another cited meta-analysis is even more frank
in acknowledging the limits of its empirical foundations. The authors
of that study conclude that, although its findings "suggest that drug
courts are effective at reducing reoffending," given the "wide
variability in methodological quality" and the fact that there are "few
high quality studies," "caution is warranted." 44
The authors of the GAO study reached a series of conclusions
about the effectiveness of adult drug treatment courts, based upon a
systematic collection of information from the twenty-seven selected
evaluations (which studied thirty-nine distinct courts). 5 Their analysis
showed that most, although not all, of the programs that had collected
data on criminal reoffending produced a reduction in the rate of
participants' recidivism, relative to the comparison groups, "during
periods of time that generally corresponded to the length of the drug
court program - that is, within-program."46 These reductions tended to
hold in terms of the number of participants who were rearrested for
new offenses during the program and in terms of the ercentage of
drug court participants who had "recidivism events."4 Specifically,
41. See id. at 16-17.
42. See JEFF LATIMER ET AL., DEP'T OF JUSTICE CAN., A META-ANALYTIC EXAMINATION
OF DRUG TREATMENT COURTS: Do THEY REDUCE RECIDIVISM? 5 (2006).
43. See id.
44. David B. Wilson, Ojmarrh Mitchell, & Doris L. MacKenzie, A Systematic Review
ofDrug Court Effects on Recidivism, 2 J. EXPERIMENTAL CRIM. 459 (2006).
45. GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 2.
46. Id. at 5. Twenty-three of the thirty-nine programs studied reported recidivism data.
See id. at 44.
47. Id. at 44.
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ten of the thirteen programs for which there were relevant data showed
a statistically significant reduction in the percentage of the participant
group that had been rearrested within-program, while ten of twelve
programs with reliable data on reconviction rates showed a statistically
significant reduction. Finally, in eleven of sixteen programs that
retained information about length of time to first arrest or conviction, a
statistically significant improvement was demonstrable.49
Others who have evaluated meta-studies of offender treatment
programs have observed that it is crucial to distinguish between
"clinical and criminogenic outcome variables."5 0 The former "refer to
some dimension of personal functioning," 5' and include drug misuse,
while the latter refer to "outcomes concerned with crime, such as court
appearance, self-reported offending, recidivism, and type of
offense." 52 With respect to clinical outcomes, the GAO authors
examined whether drug courts generally are successful in reducing
substance use relapse.53 They concluded that the evidence was "limited
and mixed." 54 Only eight programs had comparative data on relapse;
in some cases these data were based on drug test results, while in
others they were participant self reports. Four of the five programs
that retained drug test results reported reductions in relapse, while
most of the programs that collected data based upon self reports of
drug use showed no difference in relapse rates between drug court
participants and those in the control groups.56
The authors of the GAO study also examined the rates at which
participants completed, or "graduated from," the drug court programs
under review, as well as the factors associated with successful program
completion.5 7 They found a wide variation among the jurisdictions,
48. Id. at 45, 47.
49. See id. at 49. The GAO authors also concluded that "limited evidence indicates that
recidivism reductions endure." Id. at 52. In particular, they found that thirteen of seventeen
programs that reported post-program recidivism rates were able to demonstrate lower rearrest
rates or reconviction rates than comparison groups. Id. Marlowe reports that some of the
studies he reviewed indicate that "the effects have been shown to last at least 3 years post-
entry" and that "one study reported reductions in crime lasting an astounding 14 years."
Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, supra note 29, at 14.
50. Hollin, supra note 15, at 362.
51. Id.
52. Id. at 362-63.
53. See GAO ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 57.
54. Id. at 6.
55. See id. at 57-59.
56. See id. at 60.
57. Id. at 62.
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ranging from a low of twenty-seven percent program completion to a
58high of sixty-six percent. Notwithstanding this variation in
completion rates, the GAO observed that participants who completed a
drug court program had lower criminal recidivism rates than did those
who dropped out.59 Given this measurable difference, the reliance in
some other studies on drop-outs as a comparison group raises special
concerns.
Not surprisingly, the factor most closely associated with
program completion was the participants' compliance with drug court
procedures and requirements. o "No other program factor, such as the
severity of the sanction that would be imposed if participants failed to
complete the program or the manner in which judges conducted status
hearings, predicted participants' program completion."61 In light of the
claim that criminal system coercion is an important therapeutic lever in
successful drug courts, it is significant that the GAO evaluators were
unable to confirm that program completion rates were associated with
the "legal consequences of program failure."62
Several offender characteristics, however, were associated with
successful completion of the drug court regime. Participants who had
relatively fewer prior involvements in the criminal system and who
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 64.
61. Id. at 62.
62. Id. at 67. Although several evaluations included within the GAO study did seek to
measure the effects of different sanctions on graduation rates, the GAO report describes the
results of these evaluations as "mixed and not directly comparable." Id. Thus, the Brooklyn
Treatment Court generated data indicating that participants facing longer terms of
incarceration in the event of program failure were more likely to complete the program, while
data from the Suffolk County drug court showed no such relationship. Id. In his recent essay,
Professor Marlowe cites to several "dismantling studies" demonstrating that "escalating
sanctions and rewards" and "coercive leverage" are critical to drug court success. See
Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, supra note 29, at 14. On the other hand, the
Sentencing Project's report found that many drug treatment courts "do not have a formal
system under which sanctions are imposed, nor are records kept for when and why sanctions
are enforced. This is problematic when attempting to evaluate the efficacy of a drug court
intervention." King & Pasquarella, supra note 31, at 10. After reviewing the available studies,
these authors concluded that
[t]he data on sanctions presents a mixed picture. It may be that sanctions
alone are not effective predictors of success, but in conjunction with other
program elements can play an important role in leading to elevated
retention rates. There is also some evidence suggesting that the
implementation of sanctions is uneven in many courts, which might
explain differential outcomes.
Id. at 12. Clearly more research of this sort is essential if the operation of these courts is to be
fully understood.
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were older were more likely to graduate than were other participants. 63
These findings are important, because they suggest that certain basic
principles researchers have identified in the course of conducting
meta-analyses of treatment programs for offenders more generally are
likely to apply to drug courts as well. These principles, elaborated in
the "what works" literature,64 include the "risk principle," which holds
that effective programs must conduct risk assessments of clients in
order to match them with appropriate services, and the "responsivity
principle," which holds that successful treatment design should
"engag[e] offenders at a level that is consistent with their individual
ability and learning style."65 One evaluation included in the GAO
study is particularly interesting in this regard. It sought to "measure the
effect of motivation and readiness for treatment on program
completion" and "found that those participants who were better able to
recognize their problems, recognize external problems, and were read
for treatment, were more likely to complete the drug court program."6
In essence, the findings of the GAO study suggest that drug
courts succeed in retaining participants in treatment (to the extent that
they do so) not so much because of the particular elements or design
features of a given program, but rather because of the characteristics of
individual participants, including those characteristics that make
substance users "treatment ready." 67 The authors' conclusion, "that
63. GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 69.
64. This literature reports on a number of meta-analytic studies that have been
undertaken over the past fifteen years or so in response to the "nothing works" message that
took hold in the political climate of the 1970s and 1980s, following the publication of a paper
by Martinson in 1974 suggesting that prison-based rehabilitative efforts do not work. See
Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. INT.
25 (1974). These more recent evaluations reveal that, despite considerable variation, offender
treatment efforts do generally produce "an overall positive net gain . . . when treated offender
groups are compared to nontreatment groups." Hollin, supra note 15, at 363.
65. Hollin, supra note 15, at 364-65.
66. GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 69-70.
67. Some experts in the addictions field have begun to map out the stages that persons
typically go through both in the process of becoming addicted to alcohol or other drugs and in
recovering from those substance use disorders. In light of these insights into the progression of
the disease, these experts assert that the efficaciousness of treatment may depend on how
therapeutic interventions are timed; that is, success may turn in significant part on making
treatment available at moments in the progression of a substance use disorder when an
individual is "treatment ready." See generally CARLO C. DICLEMENTE, ADDICTION AND
CHANGE: How ADDICTIONS DEVELOP AND ADDICTED PEOPLE RECOVER (2003). The fortuitous
moment of criminal arrest may or may not coincide with the point in the development of the
defendant's disease process at which he or she is most amenable to treatment. If such a
coincidence is not present, the additional pressure of criminal system coercion may be
required to retain the person in treatment; but this involuntary approach may carry other
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drug court programs can be an effective means to deal with some
offenders,"6 recognizes this fundamental fact about the importance of
tailoring therapeutic interventions to the individual needs of those with
substance use disorders. 69
These data, then, support the conclusion that some treatment
courts can be efficacious for some participants, which is a different
claim than the more ambitious conclusion that this model is effective
generally. 70 With respect to virtually all of the outcome studies, the
reports are comparative and the absolute rates of reoffending are still
extremely high.7 ' In addition, the positive results with respect to
recidivism hold only for those participants who have completed the
counterproductive consequences that could be avoided if a non-coercive alternative were
available.
68. GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 7 (emphasis added).
69. Of course, even this modest assessment of the potential for these courts to generate
positive outcomes has to be tempered by an awareness of the limits of the GAO's analysis and
of the data that were available. In the first place, the GAO's assessment was based upon its
review of data drawn from only thirty-nine drug courts out of a universe of more than 1,000
such programs. Id. at 3. Moreover, the selection of these thirty-nine courts was based upon the
methodological soundness of the evaluations that had produced the data, and not on their
typicality or the representativeness of these programs relative to other drug treatment courts
around the country. The authors acknowledged as much in observing that they had "selected
the evaluations in our review according to the strength of their methodologies; therefore, our
results cannot be generalized to all drug court programs or their evaluations." Id. A similar
caution should attach to the claims of success derived from the findings of other meta-
analyses, see e.g., Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, supra note 29, at 14, given the
remarkable diversity of procedures, institutional structure, and other essential characteristics
that one finds in this field. As the National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers' recent
report put it, "virtually every problem-solving court is different. Even within the same state or
subdivision, the rules, the practices and the protections for the accused are ad hoc, and
sometimes irrational." NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEF. LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 8.
70. See e.g., William G. Meyer & A. William Ritter, Drug Courts Work, 14 FED. SENT'G
REP.179 (2001-02). As Douglas Marlowe has explained, "[e]fficacy refers to whether the
intervention can be successful when it is properly implemented under controlled conditions,
whereas effectiveness refers to whether the intervention typically is successful in actual
clinical practice." Douglas B. Marlowe, Drug Court Efficacy vs. Effectiveness, NEWS
FEATURES (Boston University School of Public Health/Join Together Project, Boston, Mass.),
Sept. 29, 2004, http://www.jointogether.org/y/0,2521,574745,oo.html.
71. See e.g. Denise Gottfredson & M. Lyn Exum, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment
Court: One-Year Results from a Randomized Study, 39 J. RESEARCH IN CRIME & DELINQ. 337,
350 (2002). See also Denise Gottfredson, Brook W. Kearley, Stacy S. Najaka, & Carlos M.
Rocha, The Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court 3-Year Self-Report Outcome Study, 29
EVALUATION REV. 42 (2005) (forty-nine and one-half percent of Treatment Court participants
at the three-year mark report re-arrest within prior twelve months versus fifty-eight percent of
control group; sixty-six percent of Baltimore City Drug Treatment Court participants had been
rearrested within two years of admission, compared with a rate of eighty-one percent for
defendants who had been processed through Baltimore's traditional criminal courts system;
seventy-eight percent of Drug Treatment Court participants had been rearrested at the three
year mark compared with eighty-eight percent of controls).
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program; those who drop out recidivate at a rate comparable to persons
72in the control groups.
Finally, recidivism is measured in these evaluations primarily
in terms of rearrests and reconvictions. As the authors of the GAO
study concede, however, "[r]earrests, as well as reconvictions, do not
measure all re-offending, as every offense or violation does not lead to
an arrest."73 Indeed, rearrest data can be particularly misleading
because official arrest records may capture as little as one percent of
the overall criminal activity of an active "street addict." 74 Other
measures that can more accurately track the success of interventions
include self-reports of drug use, self-reports of the intensity or rate of
criminal activity ("defined as either the actual number of crimes
committed over a given time period, the percentage of time involved in
committing crimes, or the number of 'crime-days' per year"), or
"psychosocial measures of family reintegration, job skills attainment"
and the like.76 With respect to psychosocial measures, a group of
experts who have been studying the performance of the Baltimore City
Drug Treatment Courts reported in 2005 that "virtually no research has
focused on outcomes of interest other than recidivism (such as
employment, health, and social connections), and the few studies that
addressed other outcomes were all plagued with problems such as
small sample size, a limited follow-up period, and program
implementation difficulties."77 After collecting data at the three-year
mark from a group of participants in the Baltimore Drug Treatment
Courts and a randomized control group, these researchers concluded
that "with the exception of welfare status, the positive effects of the
drug treatment courts do not extend to the broader set of outcomes
claimed by advocates," including employment status and family and
78social functioning.
To provide some context for the GAO's modest appraisal of
the efficacy of drug courts, as well as the more enthusiastic
72. GAO, ADULT DRUG COURTS, supra note 34, at 62.
73. Id. at 45 n.4.
74. See James Swartz, TASC - The Next 20 Years: Extending, Refining, and Assessing
the Model, in DRUG TREATMENT & CRIM. JUST. 127, 142 (James Inciardi, ed., 1993).
75. Id. at 143-44.
76. Susan Turner, et al., A Decade of Drug Treatment Court Research, 37 SUBSTANCE
USE & MISUSE 1489, 1508 (2002).
77. Gottfredson, et al., supra note 71, at 44.
78. Id. at 61.
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endorsements of others,79 it may be helpful to look at a national
evaluation, funded some years ago by the National Institute of Justice
and conducted by the RAND Corporation (RAND), of fourteen drug
treatment courts. The fourteen programs had all received
implementation grant funding in the mid-1990s from the Drug Courts
Program Office, which had been established with the passage of the
federal Omnibus Crime Control Act.80 The researchers at RAND
reported that the functional characteristics of the drug courts under
review-"the types of models implemented, eligibility requirements,
court and treatment requirements, and program implementation
difficulties"-were consistent with the characteristics of other drug
court programs as revealed in earlier national surveys and reviews, and
were "typical of drug treatment courts across the country."8'
Given the typicality of these drug court programs, the
conclusions reached by the RAND researchers are worth exploring.
With respect to the adequacy of rehabilitative services, they concluded
that "[a]ccess to a continuum of alcohol and drug user treatment
services and other related rehabilitative services was often difficult,
reflecting funding issues, as well as close coordination and information
flow issues between treatment providers and other drug treatment
court staff."82 The RAND evaluators reported that frequently
encountered problems included: a lack of regular and formalized
communication between court personnel and treatment providers;
inadequate case management resources; a lack of resources to support
needed residential treatment and nursing services; ongoing tensions
between the "supervision and rehabilitation objectives" of the
program; and persistent pressure to process a large number of clients,
which often exceeded the treatment providers' clinical capacity.83
A similar set of cautions about the adequacy of treatment
provided in some drug courts is raised by the authors of the Sentencing
Project's evaluation. These researchers point out that "drug courts may
not best serve those with the most serious addictions," and argue that it
is "crucial to disentangle failures of drug treatment due to an
79. See e.g., C. WEST HUDDLESTON, III, ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE ASSISTANCE, U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, PAINTING THE CURRENT PICTURE: A NATIONAL REPORT CARD ON DRUG
COURTS AND OTHER PROBLEM SOLVING COURT PROGRAMS IN THE UNITED STATES 6 (2004);
Marlowe, The Verdict on Adult Drug Courts, supra note 29, at 14.
80. Turner, et al., supra note 76, at 1503 (discussing grants awarded pursuant to Title V
of the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322).
81. Id. at 1504.
82. Id. at 1505.
83. Id. at 1506-07.
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individual's reticence to complete treatment from those resulting from
persons who were simply placed in a program that was inappropriate
for their needs." 84
The RAND report concludes that "many treatment programs
utilized by drug treatment court programs may not be delivering the
best treatment to clients," and that "more attention" should be given
"to the type and quality of treatment services. The limited access of
many drug courts to residential treatment facilities and to specialized
services for women, persons with co-occurring mental illnesses and
others with special needs is a significant shortcoming. 86  The
Sentencing Project's analysis reports a shortage of treatment slots for
women, observing that women are "likely to have to wait twice as long
as men for an open treatment slot."8 In addition, many drug courts
have chosen not to work with methadone maintenance programs and
84. King & Pasquarella, supra note 31, at 14-15. It is likely that variations in outcome
depend upon a variety of features found in therapeutic courts. These features could be, but
generally are not currently, tailored to a whole range of characteristics that determine
participants' clinical needs. For example, some studies have shown a strong correlation
between gender and treatment readiness among the population of persons with drug use
disorders, and one study has documented that women with mental health problems have the
highest level of openness to treatment. See J.M. Webster et al., Gender, Mental Health, and
Treatment Motivation in a Drug Court Setting, 38 J. PSYCHOACTIVE DRUGS 441 (2006). To
the extent that these women have "higher levels of problem recognition and desire for help,"
Id. at 445, it may be that less coercive interventions targeted to this group would be more
productive than the approach followed now in many drug treatment courts and other problem-
solving courts. In addition, research into treatment matching suggests that highly structured
cognitive-behavioral therapies may work best for some clients, while insight-oriented
interventions or educational approaches might be better suited to others, and that inappropriate
assignments to modalities of treatment that are contraindicated may have the effect of
increasing problematic behaviors and criminal recidivism. Related to this point, it is
significant that the drug treatment court model assumes that most drug defendants are
chemically dependent, and that their physical and/or psychological dependence drives their
criminal conduct. As a consequence, the model generally includes an intensive addictions
treatment component designed to help initiate and sustain a process of recovery. Recent
research has raised questions about the accuracy of this picture, however, and about the
universal need for intensive addiction treatment services for all the defendants assigned to
drug treatment courts. Indeed, one published paper has suggested that "roughly on third of
drug court clients do not have a clinically significant substance use disorder." D.S. DeMatteo
et al., Secondary Prevention Services for Clients Who Are Low Risk in Drug Court: A
Conceptual Model. 52 CRIME & DELINQ. 114, 114, 115 (2006).
85. Turner, et al., supra note 76, at 1513 (discussing Shelley Johnson, et al., Drug
Courts and Treatment: Lessons to be Learned from the "What Works" Literature, 4
CORRECTIONS MGMT. Q. 70 (2000)).
86. See ELIZABETH A. PEYTON & ROBERT GoSSWEILER, TASC, TREATMENT SERVICES IN
ADULT DRUG COURTS XV (2001), available at www.ncjrs.org/txfilesl/ojp/188085.txt. See
also, Drug Courts Frustrated Over Client Treatment Options, 13 ALCOHOLISM & DRUG ABUSE
WKLY. I (Aug. 13, 2001).
87. King & Pasquarella, supra note 31, at 16.
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other treatment providers who use opiate-replacement medications,
despite the fact that overwhelming evidence suggests that a segment of
the client population who do not respond to other forms of treatment
benefit from these kinds of pharmacological interventions. 8 Indeed,
methadone maintenance treatment consistently has been demonstrated
to reduce drug use and criminal activity among opiate addicts far more
effectively than other forms of drug-free outpatient therapy.89
There are costs to using the criminal justice system as an
adjunct to treatment, even if this approach offers some benefits to
some clients in terms of retention in treatment. At least in those drug
courts that require guilty pleas and that do not automatically expunge
convictions upon graduation, the blending of punitive and therapeutic
impulses can exact a substantial cost from participants. Even in
instances where clients gain access to appropriate rehabilitative
services and experience treatment successes, their long-term prognosis
may depend substantially on their ability to hold a job and maintain
stable family relationships. Because federal and state laws restrict
people with drug convictions from public housing, prevent them from
qualifying for certain occupational licenses, and impose a variety of
other barriers on full community participation, and because many
employers ask about convictions and make job decisions based on past
criminal records,90 the drug conviction alone ma ,, as one expert has
put it, "condemn drug court graduates to failure." 9
88. See Lauren Amato, et al., An Overview of Systematic Reviews of the Effectiveness of
Opiate Maintenance Therapies: Available Evidence to Inform Clinical Practice and Research.
28 JOURNAL OF SUBSTANCE ABUSE TREATMENT 321 (2005); Stephen Magura, et al., The
Effectiveness of In-Jail Methadone Maintenance, 23 J. DRUG ISSUES 75 (1993).
89. See Marlowe, Integrating Substance and Supervision, supra note 5, at 13. It is
interesting to note that the aversion of drug treatment courts in the U.S. to methadone
maintenance therapy is not shared universally in this country or internationally. For example,
research describing a highly successful court diversion program in New South Wales not only
attributes some of the success of the program to its non-coercive design, but also reports that
over a fifth of the participants received methadone maintenance treatment. See David Reilly,
John Scantleton & Peter Didcott, Magistrates' Early Referral into Treatment (MERIT):
Preliminary Findings of a 12-Month Court Diversion Trial for Drug Offenders, 21 DRUG &
ALCOHOL REV. 393, 395 (2002).
90. See generally Nora V. Demleitner, Collateral Damage: No Re-Entry For Drug
Offenders, 47 VILL. L. REv. 1027, 1033-1039 (2002). A typical example is the law in Rhode
Island, which provides that conviction of an enumerated felony disqualifies an individual from
employment in a "nursing facility, a home nursing care provider, or a home care provider
which is or is required to be licensed, registered, or certified with the department of health if
that employment involves routine contact with a patient or resident without the presence of
other employees. . ." R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 23-17-34 to 37 (2001). Federal guidelines governing
public housing permit public housing authorities and other federally-assisted housing
providers to exclude many ex-offenders, including those convicted of drug-related offenses.
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While the GAO study, the RAND study, the reports by the
Sentencing Project and the National Association of Criminal Defense
Attorneys, and the various meta-analyses discussed earlier provide a
detailed picture of these diverse and complicated institutions, the
observational work of the on-the-ground functioning of specific drug
courts undertaken by other researchers provides a different but also
useful snapshot. Instead of seeking to evaluate these courts on the
basis of aggregated data about outcomes, such as the reoffending rates
of their participants, these studies offer data and analyses of identified
operational features of individual courts. Two such efforts focused
particularly on the detailed interactions between drug court defendants
and drug court judges are especially worth considering, because they
begin to provide some important insights into why drug courts may
succeed for some participants and fail others.
The first of these two observational projects is reported in an
article entitled Tough Love: Nurturing and Coercing Responsibility
and Recovery in California Drug Courts, in which sociologists Stacy
Bums and Mark Peyrot set out the findings of their "naturalistic and
ethnomethodological" observations of several California drug courts.92
See LEGAL ACTION CENTER, SAFE AT HOME: A REFERENCE GUIDE FOR PUBLIC HOUSING
OFFICIALS ON THE FEDERAL HOUSING LAWS REGARDING ADMISSION AND EVICTION STANDARDS
FOR PEOPLE WITH CRIMINAL RECORDS 5-8,
http://lac.org/doc_1ibrary/lac/publications/Safe@Home.pdf. A number of public housing
authorities around the country maintain a policy of refusing housing on the basis of criminal
records. The housing authority for Los Angeles bars any person convicted of a "serious
felony" for a period of ten years. Id. With respect to welfare benefits, federal law provides that
individuals convicted of a drug felony shall be banned permanently from receiving food
stamps or Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). See 21 U.S.C.A. § 862a (West
2002). The federal law does permit individual states to modify this position, and a number
have opted to waive or modify the federal ban.
91. Bob Curley, Drug Courts, Treatment Programs Seek Trust, Understanding, NEWS
FEATURES (Boston University School of Public Health/Join Together Project, Boston, Mass.),
Sept. 5, 2003, http://www.jointogether.org/sa/news/features/reader/0,I854,566634,00.html.
There is also some reason to believe that drug treatment courts may be "exacerbating existing
racial disparities" in the system, in part because of disparities in arrest patterns, but also
because eligibility criteria "tend to disqualify persons whose offenses would otherwise result
in a prison sentence and those with a longer criminal history, and because participants of color
may have higher failure rates than whites "due to socioeconomic disadvantage." King &
Pasquarella, supra note 31, at 17-18 (citing Michael O'Hear, Rethinking Drug Courts:
Restorative Justice As A Response to Racial Injustice, 20 STAN. L. & POL'Y REv. 463 (2009).
92. See Stacy Lee Bums & Mark Peyrot, Tough Love: Nurturing and Coercing
Responsibility and Recovery in California Drug Courts, 50 SOC. PROBS. 416 (2003). Burns
and Peyrot describe their approach to this sociological investigation in the following terms:
"In this study we pursued a naturalistic and ethnomethodological interest in discovering 'what
local people consider meaningful [and] making their concerns accessible to readers who are
unfamiliar with their social world."' Id. at 420 (citations omitted).
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The researchers studied seventy-five drug court sessions and compiled
"detailed field-notes of the interactions between judge and the
defendant in these sessions." 93 The article includes a number of
excerpts of transcribed interactions from these court sessions. Based
upon these data, the researchers conclude that "drug court judges and
defendants interact (and sometimes vie) to construct the defendant as
either a personally responsible, rehabilitatively changed 'recoverin '
person, or, alternatively as a person in need of sanction."
Importantly, according to Burns and Peyrot, this choice involves a
moral assessment rather than a straightforward adjudication of the
defendants' actions and the legal significance of that conduct.95 The
judges in these courts are interested
in what the actions reveal about the selves under
consideration. [The] judges look beyond, behind, and
beneath surface appearances to see if defendants are
worthy of 'treatment' in drug court and if they are
succeeding according to the court's terms. Drug court
judges try to determine if they are dealing with persons
who can be repaired and restored, or with irremediably
deficient selves ... 96
This notion, that at least some defendants in drug treatment
court are designated by the judges as morally "deficient" (perhaps,
"irremediably" so), is apparent as well in the observational data
reported by Terance Miethe, Hong Lu, and Erin Reese in their article
Reintegrative Shaming and Recidivism Risks in Drug Court:
Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings.97 One lens through
which to read this data is provided by the work of John Braithwaite, a
leading figure in the development of the theory of restorative justice,
on the process of "reintegrative shaming." 98 A number of writers about
drug courts in particular and problem-solving courts more generally
have speculated that these courts might be effective precisely because
their operational features meet the theoretical description of a
93. Id. at 420.
94. Id. at 418.
95. Id. at 433.
96. Id.
97. See Terance D. Miethe, Hong Lu, & Erin Reese, Reintegrative Shaming and
Recidivism Risks in Drug Court: Explanations for Some Unexpected Findings, 46 CRIME &
DELINQ. 522 (2000).
98. See JOHN BRAITHWAITE, CRIME, SHAME, AND REINTEGRATION 100-01 (1989).
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restorative justice undertaking. Thus, Miethe, Lu, and Reese point out
that "the organizational characteristics and process of drug court are
logically consistent with the dictates of reintegrative shaming," 99 while
Barry Goetz has suggested that "the popularity of drug courts
continues to rest precisely on the ways in which judges and other court
staff can 'moralize' about the content of deviant acts to offenders, a
theme consistent with reintegrative shaming." 00
Braithwaite's theory builds upon the work of labeling theorists
to suggest that criminal court proceedings function as public
ceremonies in which the offender's deviance is certified.' 0 ' Unlike
traditional criminal blaming processes, however, the reintegrative
shaming approach suggested by Braithwaite links this initial
certification event with an eventual termination ceremony intended to
decertify that deviance and return the offender to his or her
community.' 02 In between these certification and decertification
events, the theory calls upon designated actors within the immediate
community to convey to the offender their disapproval of his or her
transgressive conduct, but to do so within a developing relationship of
respect and social interconnectedness. 0 3 Finally, the theory insists that
these expressions of disapproval should be directed at the offender's
conduct and not at the offender himself or herself.104
In the Miethe, Lu, and Reese study, the authors' hypothesis
that the drug treatment court model would function well as a
reintegrative shaming process was not supported by their observational
data. Following the offenders' initial court appearance in which their
deviance was certified, the
field observations of [subsequent] court sessions
revealed a clear preponderance of stigmatizing rather
than reintegrative comments directed at most offenders.
99. Miethe et al., supra note 97, at 536.
100. Barry Goetz, The Rise of Therapeutic Jurisprudence and the Decline of
Reintegrative Community Policing: Braithwaite's Theory & Experiments in American Drug
Control (Jul. 31, 2008) (paper presented at the 2008 Annual Meeting of the American
Sociological Association in Boston, MA), available at
http://www.allacademic.com/meta/P240594_index.html.
101. See BRAITHWAITE, supra note 98, at 101. Bums and Peyrot link this idea to the work
of Harold Garfinkel on "status degradation ceremonies." See Bums & Peyrot, supra note 92,
at 432 (discussing Harold Garfinkel, Conditions of Successful Degradation Ceremonies, 61
AM. J. Soc. 420 (1956)).
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The individual defendant, not the act itself, was clearly
the focal point of the judge's common 'tongue
lashings.' These comments were usually of the type,
'Don't you know what this stuff does to your brain!',
'I'm tired of your excuses,' and 'I'm through with
you.'105
In addition, insufficient efforts were made to reintegrate
participants into the broader community. Although graduates did
receive a T-shirt and key chain stating that they were "2 smart 4
drugs," the decertification ceremony was "largely symbolic and
perfunctory," and the provision of ongoing transition help was
limited.106 Finally, Miethe, Lu, and Reese report that the goal of
reconnecting drug court participants to their families and other social
support networks was ill-served in many cases by the concrete
interactions that took place in the drug court process.10 7 They explain
that
the effort to increase offenders' embeddedness in social
institutions and interdependencies through repeated
contact with court officials, and in particular the judge,
failed to produce the expected results. It is theoretically
sound that requiring offenders to meet with the judge
frequently and making the judge serve multiple roles of
court official, social worker, and psychologist will
enhance the relationship between the offender and the
judge and, consequently, improve the offender's
rehabilitation. In reality, our field research shows that
offenders do not generally regard court officials,
including the judge, as persons they highly respect. We
also found only a few instances in our field
observations in which the judge encouraged greater
family interdependencies by telling family members to
help the defendants 'keep up the treatment.' Hence, the
105. Id. at 537.
106. Id. Thus, "[bly moving from a rigid and highly structured environment to a
potentially chaotic and unstable environment in a matter of weeks, it should not be surprising
that drug court graduates experience[d] high rates of relapse and recidivism." Id.
107. Id.
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effect of reintegrative shaming is necessarily
reduced. 08
Although both the rhetoric and the design features of drug
courts and many other problem-solving courts suggest that they should
succeed within the Braithwaite model of restorative justice, the fact
that they do not consistently do so likely is due to the hydraulics of
virtually all treatment/punishment hybrids, under which therapeutic
impulses tend to collapse into punitive practices, and to the powerful
social meanings associated with drug misuse and addiction. As the
broad but ultimately unsuccessful effort to adopt rehabilitative penal
practices in the middle part of the Twentieth Century (and the more
particularized failures of the juvenile court movement over most of the
last century) suggests, joining punitive and therapeutic functions
within a single hybrid institutional structure is fraught with risks. 09
These risks derive from a number of sources, but especially from what
the mid-century critics of the "rehabilitative ideal" referred to as the
inherent tendency of these merged enterprises "in practical application
to become debased and to serve other social ends far removed from
and sometimes inconsistent with the reform of offenders."'10 The
critics argued that the "natural progress of any program of coercion is
one of escalation,"" 'I and that a persistent "competition between
rehabilitation and the punitive and deterrent purposes of penal
justice ... [in which the] rehabilitative ideal is ordinarily outmatched
in the stru gle" 12 helps to explain this inclination toward
debasement.
While a "predominant narrative" of the problem-solving court
movement is that it turns on "efforts of 'integrating' and 'harmonizing'
the professional approaches of justice and treatment," some observers
have suggested that "[t]he ontological framework of 'crime' and
'disease,' applied to the problem of drug addiction, makes for
108. See Miethe et al., supra note 97, at 538.
109. See Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Court
Movement, 76 WASH. U. L. Q. 1205, 1218-1245; 1269-1278. See also FRANCIS A. ALLEN,
THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL (1981); ELLEN RYERSON, THE BEST-LAID PLANS:
AMERICA'S JUVENILE COURT EXPERIMENT (1978).
110. ALLEN, supra note 109, at 49.
111. AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMMITTEE, STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE: A REPORT ON
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA 25 (1971).
112. ALLEN, supra note 109, at 53-54.
113. The critics asserted that debasement is virtually inevitable given the "conceptual
weakness" of rehabilitative punishment, and the fact that criminal justice institutions "must
serve punitive, deterrent, and incapacitative ends." Id. at 51-53.
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fundamentally different assumptions, practices and goals."' 14 Indeed,
"[t]hese perspectives are not only fundamentally different," they may
well be "contradictory and exclusionary in many of their assumptions
and principles."'"5 Thus, "the actual meaningfulness of jointly
applying the figurative 'tomahawk' and the 'healing balm' . . . to the
offender, in principle and practice, remains an open question."' 16
Beyond the inherent instability of rehabilitative punishment
and its tendency to become debased in practice, there may be a second
explanation for the less than optimal fit between the theoretical
requirements of the restorative justice model on the one hand, and
reports of the actual operation of particular drug courts offered in the
observational studies on the other hand. This explanation is rooted in
the social meanings that have become associated with the misuse of
drugs and particularly with the misuse of illicit drugs. This moral
vocabulary has been a feature of drug policy in the United States for
many years.
The trajectory of drug policy in the U.S. was set by the passage
of the Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914 (the "Harrison Act"), which first
established broad-based criminal prohibitions in this field;' "7 by a
series of U.S. Supreme Court decisions interpreting federal law to limit
the ability of physicians to treat addicts with maintenance doses of
narcotics;8 and by the aggressive drug enforcement approach of
officials within the U.S. Treasury Department almost from the
beginning of this legal regime.119 At the core of this policy was an
"insistence on the idea that addicts are bad characters and that
addiction essentially is a police problem . . ."'20
Troy Duster, a sociologist and historian of U.S. Drug Policy,
has argued that the moral disapproval associated with narcotics use
grew to be so powerful over the course of the Twentieth Century that it
ultimately became totalizing, eclipsing all the other otherwise morally
significant features of an individual user.' 2 1 Although moral
114. Fischer, supra note 1, at 234-35.
115. Id. at 235.
116. Id.
I 17. See Harrison Narcotics Act of 1914, Pub. L. No. 63-223, 38 Stat. 785 (1914)
(repealed 1970).
118. See United States v. Doremus, 249 U.S. 86 (1919); Webb v. United States, 249 U.S.
96 (1919); United States v. Behrman, 258 U.S. 280 (1922).
119. See generally DAVID F. MUSTO, THE AMERICAN DISEASE: ORIGINS OF NARCOTIC
CONTROL (1999).
120. EDWIN M. SCHUR, NARCOTIC ADDICTION IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 192 (1962).
121. TROY DUSTER, THE LEGISLATION OF MORALITY 67 (1970).
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disapproval may have been directed toward narcotics misuse in the
U.S. at an earlier point, it is likely that these pejorative judgments did
not function as an absolute or totalizing moral characterization of users
until some time after passage of the Harrison Act.' 22 This intense
moral disapproval was reflected in drug policies adopted following
World War II and in the "War on Drugs" that began in the Nixon
administration and that has persisted to the present. 3 That policy, in
turn, has reinforced and sustained the social opprobrium that has
marked drug use and drug users.124
Consistent with this picture of the pervasive moral disapproval
of drug users, criminal law scholars Franklin Zimring and Gordon
Hawkins have described U.S. drug policy as rooted in a "legalist"
school of thought that conceives of illicit drugs as a threat "to the
established order and political authority structure." 25 In this view, the
inherent immorality of drug use renders "the consumption of the
prohibited substance rather than any secondary consequences that
might ensue" the principle harm to be addressed.126 "The taking of
drugs prohibited by the government," they suggest, "is an act of
rebellion, of defiance of lawful authority that threatens the social
fabric."l 27
The moral disapprobation that attends drug misuse complicates
efforts to provide supportive, reintegrative treatment within the context
of the criminal blaming system. This stigma has undermined the
adoption of a harm minimization philosophy of the sort that informs
122. See id. at 67, 91-92. "A person who exhibits this presumably obvious special kind
of behavior (immoral, in this instance) is identified in a complete sense through a particular
label; thus generating total identity." Id. at 89.
123. For a good review of this history, see KING COUNTY BAR Ass'N DRUG POLICY
PROJECT, supra note 3, at 15-31.
124. James Nolan has suggested that there are "three distinct 'root metaphors' or
'legitimizing values' that have informed efforts to socially control drug use in the United
States." While one perspective, the "therapeutic paradigm," views drug users or abusers not as
immoral but as in need of treatment, and a second paradigm, the "utilitarian perspective,"
views users through either a prohibitionist or libertarian lens depending on an assessment of
the relative costs and benefits involved in strictly limiting access to narcotics, the perspective
that has dominated U.S. thinking is the "moral or the religious perspective." JAMES L. NOLAN,
JR., REINVENTING JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN DRUG COURT MOVEMENT 15-16 (2001). From this
point of view, the use of narcotics is understood to be a wrong that emanates from a bad
character, poor individual decision making, or some other attribute of the user for which he or
she is autonomously responsible. Id.
125. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING AND GORDON HAWKINS, THE SEARCH FOR RATIONAL DRUG
CONTROL 8 (1992).
126. Id. at 8-9.
127. Id. at 9.
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practice in the drug treatment courts established in a number of other
countries.128 As Zimring and Hawkins have put it, the moralism of the
legalist school drives a conception of drug treatment "in which the
participants are forced or frightened into treatment programs and
threatened into abstinence during and after treatment." One astute
observer who has written a comparative study of drug courts in the
U.S. and elsewhere has explained that "[t]he goal of most U.S. drug
courts is 'total abstinence' or what some have referred to as 'demand
reduction."1 30 By contrast, in many other jurisdictions the abstinence
model has given way to a harm minimization approach in which the
goals of the program are defined in terms of reduced use and reduced
offending.131
Burns and Peyrot report that the drug court judges they
observed responded to defendants on the basis of a stark dichotomized
choice. Some were constructed as "salvageable and rehabilitating,"
while others, specifically those who were having difficulty adhering to
the conditions of the court's treatment and surveillance regime, were
denoted as "irremediably deficient."l 32 Given the totalizing moral
judgments that pervasively are directed against drug users throughout
American society, it is difficult even for professionals in the fields of
social work and medicine to maintain an empathic and respectful
stance toward clients and patients who suffer from drug use
disorders.' 33 To the extent that these disorders are chronic, relapsing
conditions, it is inevitable that some significant number of defendants
in drug court will fail to adhere-often in a serious and sustained
way-to the requirements of the program. At those moments, the
exercise of moral discretion required of treatment court judges is
necessarily vulnerable to being corrupted by the background normative
understandings of addicts and addiction that derive from the very
criminal justice policies within which these courts are embedded.
The aggregate outcome data described earlier suggests that
some drug treatment courts are effective for some participants under
some circumstances. There is, however, considerable variation in
outcomes associated with offender characteristics and local
128. James L. Nolan, Harm Reduction and the American Difference: Drug Treatment
and Problem Solving Courts in Comparative Perspective, 13 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL'Y 31
(2010).
129. Id. at 11-12.
130. Id. at 36.
131. Id.
132. Burns & Peyrot, supra note 92, at 417.
133. See e.g., PAUL J. FINK AND ALLAN TASMAN, STIGMA AND MENTAL ILLNESS (1992).
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institutional practice, such that it is virtually impossible to make
confident global assertions that these enterprises generally are a
success or a failure.' 34 In some respects, the published studies tell a
tale of two groups. Those offenders who adhere to the requirements of
the treatment court regime and are able to graduate may stand a better
chance of beating the odds with respect to reoffending and
reinvolvement in the criminal system than do similarly situated
offenders processed through the conventional system. 1 Those
participants who do not succeed according to the terms imposed by a
model that is rooted in the criminal prohibition of drug use and that
demands abstinence as the only true measure of success face a very
different set of outcomes. Offenders who are determined to be
incapable of adhering to the requirements of the drug court program-
the "irremediably deficient"-do not graduate and do not beat the
odds.136 Their recidivism rates and clinical course are not improved by
virtue of the treatment they receive. Their fate often depends on the
discretionary decision making of judges who necessarily are members
of a broader community that assigns a negative totalizing moral
judgment to drug misusers.
Given the procedural informality of drug courts, this
discretionary judicial decision making carries the potential for real
harm. The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers reports
that "[t]he sentences in many courts are significantly higher for those
who seek drug treatment and fail than for those who simply avoid drug
treatment and take a plea, at the both the misdemeanor and felony
level."1 37 In some instances these harsher sentences are built into the
process,138 while in others they reflect an effort on the part of the drug
court judge to "set an example" for other participants or are merely an
expression of the fact that the judge is "offended at failure in drug
court."'39
Whatever its basis, the "high cost of failure"l 40 borne by drug
court participants who do not graduate is a cost that undermines the
legitimacy of the overall enterprise. As Timothy Casey has explained:
134. See supra, text accompanying notes 29 to 59.
135. See supra, text accompanying notes 17 to 21.
136. See Burns & Peyrot, supra note 92, at 433.
137. NAT'L Ass'N OF CRIMINAL DEFENSE LAWYERS, supra note 25, at 29.
138. For example, "a public defender from California reported that a judge 'automatically
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The key to understanding the potential problems with
the problem-solving court model ... lies in the moment
when the defendant is deemed to fail treatment. As
long as the treatment program continues, the exchange
of due process rights for a treatment opportunity does
not appear problematic. But when the moment of
failure, or alleged failure, arrives, the process sharply
reverts to an adversarial format .. . At this moment, the
'traditional' court system has been resurrected and the
due process rights and protections must be replaced ...
Unfortunately, [the defendant] has already waived those
rights. This moment of failure is also where the judge
exercises the most discretion, and where the power is
simultaneously at its greatest and most diffuse. The
decision of the court that the defendant did not
complete the treatment program is based not on a legal
standard, but on a clinical standard, or perhaps on a
subjective impression that the defendant is not putting
forth sufficient effort.141
These "subjective impressions" bear the mark of systemic
pressures that almost inevitably are placed on therapeutic practices
when they are situated within coercive legal settings, and of the
distortive impact that the societal stigma associated with drug misuse
has on the discretionary judgments of court actors. This confluence of
broad judicial discretion, official coercion, and pervasive social
disapprobation is a dangerous admixture for the significant number of
treatment court participants who are determined to have "failed" the
regime.
In light of the wide range of outcomes experienced by different
participants in drug courts, and given the understandable tendency of
other commentators to concentrate on the stories of those offenders
whose lives are improved by virtue of their treatment court experience,
it is important as well to focus on the cases in which participants do
not succeed in these settings. Further study is warranted in order to
press focus on the ways in which failure is defined and life courses
altered as a consequence of the legal and moral sorting accomplished
by these courts. Indeed, determining what drug court failures mean
141. Timothy Casey, When Good Intentions are not Enough: Problem-Solving Courts
and the Impending Crisis ofLegitimacy, 57 SMU L. REV. 1459, 1483 (2004).
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both for individuals and for the system is essential if we are to take
seriously the obligation to evaluate fully these undertakings.

